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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES TO
THE PROCEEDING BELOW
In addition to the parties identified in the caption,
there were two other defendants in the proceeding below.
Defendant Gerald H. Burton was dismissed before trial pursuant
to a stipulation between the parties.

Defendant City of

Springville, a municipal corporation, prevailed on a motion for
a directed verdict (on a governmental immunity defense) made at
the close of all the evidence and no parties appealed from that
directed verdict.

Neither Mr. Burton nor the City of

Springville is affected by this appeal.
For all purposes relevant to this proceeding,
defendants, appellants and cross-respondents The Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company and the Utah Railway Company
are similarly situated.

Both railroad companies are identified

in this Brief and Alternative Cross-Petition as "DRGW."

The

plaintiff, respondent, and cross-appellant, Robert L. Gleave is
referred to herein as "Mr. Gleave."

The defendant-respondent,

the Utah State Department of Transportation, is identified as
"UDOT".

UDOT is not affected by the pending petition and

alternative cross-petition.
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the Utah Supreme Court because DRGW respectful 1 y submits that
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uieave's certiorari petition is either frivolous or filed

for delay,

DRGW seeks an award of just damages and double

costs, including a pro rata reduction of DRGW's post-judgment
interest liability and reasonable attorneys' fees, for having
to resist Mr. Gleavefs frivolous Petition for Certiorari.

DRGW

made Mr. Gleave an unconditional offer of settlement of the
full judgment amount plus all accumulated post-judgment
interest as of February 23, 1988.
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is
reported at 749 P.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1988).

A copy of the

published opinion is reproduced at Appendix Exhibit A.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision January 28,
1988.

Mr. Gleave filed a petition for rehearing February 10,

1988 and DRGW filed a petition for rehearing February 12,
1988.

Both petitions were denied February 22, 1988.

After his

first petition for rehearing was denied, Mr. Gleave filed with
the Court of Appeals a so-called "Motion to Suspend The Rules"
which, if granted, would have given Mr. Gleave the
extraordinary opportunity to file a second petition for
rehearing.

The Court of Appeals denied Mr. Gleavefs Motion to

Suspend the Rules March 16, 1988.

By order of March 15, 1988,

the Supreme Court extended Mr. Gleavefs time for filing a
Petition for Certiorari to April 5, 1988.

By an Amended Notice

dated May 5, 1988, the Clerk of the Supreme Court notified the
parties that DRGW may have thirty days from that date to file a
Brief in Opposition to Mr. Gleave's Certiorari Petition and an
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Alternative Cross-Petition for Certiorari.

Jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court is conferred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (1953,
as amended).
CITATIONS TO CONTROLLING LAW
The controlling law is provided by Rule 43 of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

Rule 43 is entitled

"Considerations Governing Review of Certiorari."

Mr. Gleave

predicates his Petition for Certiorari on Rule 43(3), whereas
DRGW predicates its Cross-Petition for Certiorari on Rule 43(4).
DRGW's request for damages caused by Mr. Gleavefs
frivolous Certiorari Petition must be construed in light of the
mandatory sanction provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.

Rule 33 is entitled "Damages For Delay or

Frivolous Appeal; Recovery of Attorney's Fees."
Supreme Court Rules 33 and 43 are reproduced at
Appendix Exhibit E.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action arising from injuries

sustained by Mr. Gleave April 16, 1982 when he drove his
automobile into the path of an oncoming train owned and
operated by the DRGW.

The accident occurred at a railroad

crossing in Springville, Utah, which was protected by advance
warning signs, railroad crossing signs and a stop sign which
required motorists to stop before proceeding across the
railroad tracks.

UDOT was joined as a defendant because it

allegedly breached certain statutory duties to install adequate
traffic warning devices at the crossing.
In the Court of Appeals, DRGW appealed from a judgment
based upon a jury verdict in favor of Mr. Gleave and it
appealed an order of the lower court dismissing co-defendant
UDOT prior to trial.

In a cross-appeal to the Court of

Appeals, Mr. Gleave appealed the lower court's order granting
DRGWfs motion for a directed verdict as to Mr. Gleavefs claim
for punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court
rulings in every respect.

The case comes before the Supreme

Court on Mr. Gleavefs Petition for Certiorari and DRGW's
Alternative Cross-Petition for Certiorari.

Due to its limited

scope, DRGWfs Alternative Cross-Petition will not affect UDOT's
interests even if it is granted.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION BELOW
This action was tried before a jury in the Fourth

Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable
Cullen Y. Christensen presiding.

A pre-trial motion to dismiss

filed by UDOT was granted on the grounds that UDOT was, in the
lower court's opinion, immune from suit under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.

The Court of Appeals affirmed UDOT's

dismissal.
The case was submitted to the jury upon comparative
negligence instructions, the court having denied DRGW's Motions
for Summary Judgment (R. 460-61; 569-70) and for a directed
verdict (E. 1349; 1355) requesting that Mr. Gleave be found
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negligent as a matter of law.

The jury returned its verdict,

finding DRGW 100% at fault and Mr. Gleave 0% at fault. (R.
765-68)

The lower court entered judgment against DRGW on

August 15, 1984, in the amount of $439,937.87 (R. 808-09).

The

lower court denied post-trial motions filed by DRGW seeking, in
the alternative, a new trial, judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, or an alteration or amendment of the judgment.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
DRGW's main line tracks are crossed by a narrow,

infrequently travelled, country road at 1600 South in
Springville, Utah (R. 1244).

In this area of Utah County, the

railroad's tracks run generally in a north-south direction and,
as can be seen from the numerous photographic exhibits, the
grade for these tracks was established by making a long cut
through a hillside which extends several hundred yards to the
north from 1600 South.

(Mr. Gleave's Trial Exhibits 2A-2G,

2I-2M, 47, and 48; DRGWfs Trial Exhibits 22-33, and 41).

This

hillside causes a substantial obstruction of the view that an
eastbound motorist has of a train coming from the north.
However, since the hill essentially ends on the north side of
1600 South, an eastbound motorist's view to his right, or
south, is relatively unobstructed (R. 1739).
The train in this instance was southbound and, since
Mr. Gleave was eastbound at the time, it approached the
crossing from Mr. Gleave's left.

The crossing had the usual

round yellow sign with a cross on it to provide an advance
warning to motorists of the upcoming railroad crossing, and the

usual crossbucks at the point of the crossing to denote its
location.

In addition, this crossing had a stop sign (R. 1749).

Mr. Gleave testified that he knew he was approaching a
railroad crossing because he had been over these tracks about
three other times and because he had worked on the crossing
itself as part of an asphalt paving crew in 1979 (R. 1748 and
1757).

There was enough daylight so that he was not using his

vehicle's headlights (R. 1748), the window on the driver's side
was almost all the way up (R. 1749), and the vehicle's heater
was on (R. 1743).
Mr. Gleave testified that he saw "all the warning
signs on the road" as he approached the railroad crossing (R.
1749 and 1757).

Although Mr. Gleave never denied that: he told

the investigating police officer that he had only "slowed down"
for the stop sign (R. 1422--See the Officer's Report at
Appendix Exhibit C), during trial Mr. Gleave testified that he
came to a complete stop at the stop sign (R. 1749).
Mr. Gleave next testified that after stopping at the
sign and looking left, he then looked to his right (south) and
that he continued looking to the right as he started up from
the stop sign towards the tracks (R. 1750).

He acknowledged

that his view to the left (north) was more restricted that his
view to the right (south), claiming that from the stop sign he
could see about 900 feet down the tracks to his right (south),
but only 50-100 feet up the tracks to his left (north) (R.
1758-59).

Nevertheless, he testified unequivocally that he

travelled from the stop sign to a point where he could no
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longer stop and avoid the collision while looking only to his
right (R. 1759-60).

He claimed that he heard the train whistle

and saw the train as he glanced back to his left (north) while
his car was moving (R. 1750) and that upon seeing and hearing
the train, he immediately stopped his car (R. 1750).

Mr.

Gleave testified that he believes the train would not have hit
his vehicle if he had stopped at the point where his vehicle
was when he saw the train (R. 1775-76).
DRGW train crew member Bruce Leek testified that he
first saw Mr. Gleavefs vehicle creeping toward the crossing
about nine seconds before the collision (R. 1813), and he saw
Mr. Gleave stop with the nose of his automobile on the west
rail for about 4 or 5 seconds before the automobile disappeared
from his view under the nose of the engine shortly before the
impact (R. 1815).

He testified that the train had a "very

loud" whistle and that the train's engineer sounded the whistle
continuously from the quarter mile whistle post north of the
1600 South crossing until he interrupted the normal signal with
an emergency blowing of the whistle that continued until the
train impacted the automobile (R. 1817-1818; and 1822).
The train engineer, Gerald H. Burton, testified that
the train was travelling at 50 mph, which was the designated
speed for this train (R. 1396 and 1397).

He saw Mr. Gleave's

vehicle move slowly onto the tracks and stop (R. 1401-02) and,
at that point in time, he interrupted the normal whistle signal
to blow the whistle in rapid succession (R. 1402).

Mr. Burton

said that he thought Mr. Gleave had adequate time to remove his

vehicle from the tracks in order to prevent the accident (R.
1412).
Sergeant David Coron of the Springville Police
Department testified that he investigated this accident (R.
1416-17), that he spoke with Mr. Gleave at the scene of the
accident (R. 1419), and that Mr. Gleave was lucid at that time
(R. 1421-22).

He asked Mr. Gleave what had happened and Mr.

Gleave said he "slowed down" for the stop sign (R. 1422; also
Appendix ExhibitM C " ) .
DRGW called as a witness Mr. Arthur Geurts, Safety
Studies Engineer for UDOT.

Mr. Geurts testified that he was

responsible for UDOTfs hazard index rating for all railroad
crossings in the State of Utah (R. 981). The 1600 South
crossing was one of 1280 crossings studied by the state and the
Federal Railroad Administration.

The Federal Railroad

Administration initially and incorrectly ranked it as the 68th
most dangerous among the 1280 crossings.

In computing this

ranking, the Federal Railroad Administration believed that
train speeds in the area were 70 mph (R. 989-91).

Mr. Geurts

testified that train speeds through this crossing are only 50
mph and, by assuming 50 mph for the speed of trains in the area
instead of 70 mph, the ranking of this crossing under the UDOT
hazard index was changed from the 68th most dangerous to the
353rd most dangerous of the 1280 crossings surveyed (R. 982,
989-91).

Moreover, Mr. Geurts explained that this UDOT

evaluation was done before the stop signs were installed,
which, of course, provided a motorist with additional crossing
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protection and reduced the hazard (R. 983). In determining
what crossing protection to require at a particular crossing,
Mr. Geurts explained that UDOT considers factors such as a
motorist's sight distance at the crossing, the speed and number
of trains in the area, and the speed and volume of highway
traffic at the crossing (R. 985-87).
Mr. Joseph Bruce Yuhas, an employee of UDOT who
participated in the survey of the 1600 South crossing in
October of 1974, testified that the survey team considered
factors such as the sight distances and, after fully evaluating
the crossing, it recommended federal funds be sought to install
flashing light signals as additional crossing protection (R.
1247-49).

The team further recommended that temporary stop

signs be installed until federal funds for flashing signals
become available (R. 1241, 1258-59).
ARGUMENT
I.
MR. GLEAVE?S PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED
As DRGW understands the purpose of a Petition for
Certiorari, it is not to argue the merits of the proposed
appeal.

Rather, the purpose is to provide the Court

information as to why the Certiorari Petition should be
granted.

DRGW accordingly has 1 imited the scope of the

argument in this Brief and Alternative Cross-Petition.
Relying on Rule 43(3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, Mr. Gleave wants this Court to grant his Certiorari
Petition on the punitive damages question.

Petition for

Certiorari at 13. Mr. Gleave claims that the Court of Appeals

rendered a decision on the punitive damages question "that has
so far departed from the accepted course of judicial
proceedings . . . as to call for the exercise of this Court's
power of supervision . . . .ff Nothing in Mr. Gleavefs
Certiorari Petition supports that strong contention.
The Court of Appeals ruled that, "Before punitive
damages may be awarded, the plaintiff must prove conduct that
is willful and malicious or that manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of
others."

749 P.2d at 670 (citations omitted).

Although DRGW

thinks that the malice-in-law/reckless punitive damage standard
may not apply to this case, the Court of Appeals gave Mr.
Gleave the benefit of the doubt and applied that generous
standard instead of the more demanding malice in fact/willful
standard.

Significantly, whatever DRGW might think about the

standard, Mr. Gleave does not contend that the Court of Appeals
adopted the wrong legal standard for awarding punitive damages.
In reviewing the directed verdict in favor of DRGW,
the Court of Appeals applied the standard of review most
favorable to Mr. Gleave.

That is, the Court viewed all of the

evidence in the record in a light most favorable to Mr.
Gleave.

Having done that, the Court concluded that, at most,

the evidence supported a reasonable jury conclusion that DRGW
had been negligent.

"But," the Court explained, "evidence of

simple negligence alone does not support an award of punitive
damages."

749 P.2d at 670.
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Mr. Gleave does not take issue with the Court of
Appeal's legal standard for awarding punitive damages, nor does
Mr. Gleave take issue with the standard of review used by the
Court of Appeals in affirming the directed verdict.
dislikes the result.

He just

Stripped to its essentials, Mr. Gleavefs

Petition for Certiorari amounts to nothing more than a bad
faith request that the Supreme Court duplicate the thorough job
of appellate review that has already been done by the Court of
Appeals.
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
provides:

"Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of

right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefore.'1

Mr.

Gleave has failed to provide the Supreme Court even one good
reason to justify granting his Certiorari Petition.
Mr. Gleave's Petition for Certiorari is written as if
it were a Brief on the merits.

At pages 2-13 of his Petition

for Certiorari, Mr. Gleave indulges in broad-brush arguments
concerning selected evidence, including evidence that is not
even in the trial record.

The evidence argued by Mr. Gleave

that is not in the record pertains to alleged "near misses"
(perhaps a better term would be "non-accidents"). The Court of
Appeals notes:

"Mr. Gleavefs attorney claimed he would offer

evidence at trial of 'near misses' at the crossing, but none
was produced."

749 P.2d at 671.

DRGW concedes that Mr. Gleave at trial did offer
evidence of alleged near misses, and that the trial court

excluded that evidence.
excluded evidence.

Mr. Gleave made a proffer of the

However, after judgment was entered and

DRGW appealed and Mr. Gleave cross-appealed, Mr. Gleave did not
raise as a cross-appeal issue the exclusion of the so-called
near-miss evidence.

Since Mr. Gleave did not appeal from the

exclusion of the near-miss evidence, the Court of Appeals did
not receive Briefs or hear oral arguments bearing on the
propriety of excluding the proffered near-miss evidence.

Mr.

Gleave has waived his right to appeal from the exclusion of the
near-miss evidence.

Ignoring his own waiver, Mr. Gleave now

wants to argue that punitive damages should be awarded based on
evidence which is not in the record and which is not involved
in any issue on appeal.
Mr. Gleave also makes much of the fact that a certain
aerial photograph marked Exhibit 8 at trial was not transmitted
to the Court of Appeals by the District Court.

Exhibit 8 is an

unusually large exhibit, approximately 3 1/2 feet by 3 1/2 feet
square.

As Mr. Gleavefs lawyer well knows, it is not customary

for the Clerk of a District Court to transmit unusually large
exhibits to an appellate court unless special arrangements are
made by counsel for transmittal of the oversized exhibits.

Mr.

Gleave failed to comply with Rule 12(b)(3) of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals which provides: "Exhibits of unusual bulk
or weight other than documents shall not be transmitted by the
clerk unless directed to do so by a party or by the Clerk of
the Court of Appeals.

A party must make advance arrangments
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with the clerks for the transportation and receipt of exhibits
of unusual bulk or weight/1

Id. (emphasis added).

But even if we can assume that Mr. Gleave was not at
fault in connection with Exhibit 8, the most Mr. Gleave can
demonstrate is harmless error.

It is absurd for Mr. Gleave to

contend, as he apparently does contend, that the Court of
Appeals would have reached a different result on punitive
damages in this case if it had looked at the aerial
photograph.

Not only did the Court of Appeals have the

opportunity to review several hundred pages of trial testimony,
it also had the benefit of numerous smaller photographic
exhibits, including a video tape of the subject crossing played
by Mr. Gleave's lawyer at oral arguments before the Court of
Appeals.
Mr. Gleave claims that Exhibit 8 somehow irrefutably
"proves" that the location of the subject crossing was less
rural than the Court of Appeals thought it to be.

In fact, the

aerial photograph was cumulative evidence that added nothing
new to all of the other evidence adduced at trial concerning
the particular details about the subject crossing.
photograph changes nothing.

The

No evidence in the record,

including the large aerial photograph marked Exhibit 8 at
trial, is inconsistent with the findings by the Court of
Appeals that "locality was rural and the road not heavily
traveled."

749 P.2d at 671.

If the location is not rural,

perhaps Mr. Gleave can explain the undisputed presence of a
large tin barn at the southwest corner of the crossing.

Besides, the ultimate issue on punitive damages does
not turn on whether the crossing was in a very rural area or in
a slightly developing rural area.

The ultimate issue is

whether DRGW's conduct went beyond negligence to satisfy the
legal standard for punitive damages.

In affirming the directed

verdict on punitive damages, the Court of Appeals followed "the
general rule" which provides "that only compensatory damages
are appropriate and that punitive damages may be awarded only
in exceptional cases."

749 P.2d at 671 (citation omitted)

(emphasis in original).
No public objective would be advanced by granting Mr.
Gleave's Petition for Certiorari.

First5 it would be bad

policy to introduce punitive damages into a case where the
evidence shows negligence at most.

Second, as a matter of law,

the Court can take judicial notice that DRGW is subject to
ongoing administrative regulation by the Utah Public Service
Commission, UDOT, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the
Federal Railroad Administration.

Moreover, as the Court of

Appeals correctly held in this case, under applicable Utah
statutes, "The government alone must consistently regulate
safety devices at railroad crossings, determine which devices
at which crossings should be recommended for federal funding,
rank crossings in order of need for upgrading in light of
limited funds for that purpose, and apportion signal
installation costs between public and private entities.

As a

practical matter, the private sector cannot perform those
functions."

749 P.2d at 667-68.
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The uncontroverted evidence in the record in this case
is that all crossings throughout the State of Utah are
systematically evaluated and upgraded by UDOT as federal monies
become available.

The appropriate state and federal agencies

are acutely aware of the risks to operators of motor vehicles
at railroad crossings.

Every year millions of dollars are

appropriated by the appropriate agencies for purposes of
inspecting and, to the extent funds are available, upgrading
safety at particular crossings.
II.
DRGW'S ALTERNATIVE CROSS-PETITION SHOULD BE
GRANTED IF THE COURT GRANTS MR. GLEAVEfS PETITION:
AS A MATTER OF LAW, MR. GLEAVE COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN ENTIRELY WITHOUT FAULT
If this Court grants Mr. Gleave?s Petition, then DRGW
alternatively cross-petitions on an important issue of state
right-of-way law.

DRGWTs Alternative Cross-Petition seeks an

ultimate ruling by this Court that the verdict must be set
aside because Mr. Gleave had to have been at least 1% negligent
as a matter of the undisputed evidence and applicable
right-of-way law.

The Court of Appeals erred in refusing to

hold that a motorist in Utah is at least 1% negligent as a
matter of law if he admits to driving out in front of a train,
at a crossing marked with a stop sign, without first looking
both ways and particularly in the direction of greatest visual
obstruction.
For purposes of this Alternative Cross-Petition for
Certiorari, DRGW is not asking the Supreme Court to completely

rehear every contention raised before the Court of Appeals by
DRGW.

DRGW may disagree with some of the ultimate legal

conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals in this case, but
DRGW is only seeking further review of one of those legal
conclusions.

At this level of review, DRGW only seeks a

holding by this Court that Section II of the opinion issued in
this case by the Court of Appeals, 749 P.2d at 664-66, is wrong.
A.

MR GLEAVE WAS AT LEAST 1% NEGLIGENT BECAUSE
HE VIOLATED HIS ABSOLUTE DUTY TO YIELD THE
RIGHT OF WAY TO THE TRAIN

Both as a matter of Utah statutory and common law,
DRGW absolutely and unquestionably enjoyed a superior right of
way at the crossing where Mr. Gleave caused the accident.

See

Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-72.10, 41-6-95, 41-6-97, 41-6-99 (1953,
as amended) (reproduced at Appendix Exhibit D). DRGW had the
right of way because it is a train and because the crossing had
a stop sign for motorists like Mr. Gleave.

By violating DRGW's

superior right of way, the jury was obligated to find, but did
not find, that Mr. Gleave was at least 1% negligent.

To find

Mr. Gleave entirely without fault, as the jury did, the jury
had to have completely ignored the lower court's instructions
concerning an autoist?s absolute and non-waivable duty at a
stop sign to yield the right of way to an oncoming train.
DRGW respectfully petitions the Supreme Court to
decide this fundamental question of right-of-way law.

The

decision on Mr. Gleavefs negligence rendered by the Court of
Appeals in this case is inconsistent with, cannot be squared
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with, and is not supported by the numerous Utah Supreme Court
railroad crossing cases and statutes.

The cited cases and

statutes establish the minimum legal standard for "reasonable"
conduct of motorists approaching railroad crossings in Utah,
Mr. Gleave fell below the minimum standard of care.

The

opinion issued by the Court of Appeals does not directly or
correctly analyze the many cases and statutes which compel a
finding that Mr. Gleave was at least 1% negligent as a matter
of law.
B.

THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT MR. GLEAVE
DIDNfT LOOK BOTH WAYS BEFORE CROSSING THE
TRACKS

The opinion released by the Court of Appeals in this
case does not explain how Mr. Gleave can be found entirely
without any fault under circumstances where he admitted that
he pulled out in front of the train while looking to his right,
knowing all along that the real area of visual obstruction and
danger was to his left.

DRGW submits that it was plain error

for the Court of Appeals to sustain the jury verdict finding 0%
fault under these facts.
Even though Mr. Gleave had actual and present
knowledge that he was about to drive across railroad tracks, he
admitted that he proceeded across the tracks looking to his
right (south) and that he continued looking to the right as he
started up from the stop sign toward the tracks (R. 1750).

He

admitted that he knew his view to the left (north) was more
restricted that his view to the right (south).

He said that

from the stop sign he could see about 900 feet down the tracks
to his right (south) but only 50 to 100 feet up the tracks to
his left (north) (R. 1758-59).

Nevertheless, while still

looking right, he testified that he traveled from the stop sign
to a point where he could no longer stop and avoid the
collision.

(R. 1759-60).

Mr. Gleave admitted that only after

it was too late to prevent the accident that he finally
"glanced back to the left" and saw the train (R. 1750).
Under all the circumstances, the uncontested evidence
is that Mr. Gleave proceeded across the tracks with his eyes
foolishly glued to his right for an inordinately and
dangerously long period of time, even though he knew the area
to his left was the most obstructed and thus the area of
greatest potential danger.
The uncontroverted evidence shows that Mr. Gleave
proceeded across the tracks into the path of the train without
first looking both ways, causing at least 1% of his accident.
A new trial is necessary to allow a jury to quantify the amount
of Mr. Gleavefs negligence compared to the negligence, if any,
attributable to DRGW.
III.
RULE 33 SANCTIONS AGAINST MR. GLEAVE ARE
APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE
With respect to DRGW's request for sanctions against
Mr. Gleave, in the interests of brevity, DRGW invites the
attention of the Court to Appendix Exhibit E and Appendix
Exhibit F.
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Appendix Exhibit E is a copy of Rule 33 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court, including the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 33.

The Advisory Committee Note makes clear that

the imposition of sanctions is mandatory if the Court finds
that an appeal was frivolous or filed for delay.
Appendix Exhibit F is a copy of a letter dated March
30, 1988 from DRGW's counsel to Mr. Gleavefs counsel.

That

letter put Mr. Gleave on notice that DRGW would seek sanctions
for bad faith delay and it confirms the $625,868.81
unconditional offer of settlement made by DRGW to Mr. Gleave
February 23, 1988. Appendix Exhibit F is self-explanatory.
DRGW made its unconditional offer the day after the Court of
Appeals denied Mr. Gleavefs and DRGW's respective rehearing
petitions.
As set forth in the letter and in this Brief and
Alternative Cross-Petition, Mr. Gleave's stubborn refusal to
drop his punitive damage claim is not in good faith.

Both the

District Court and the Court of Appeals adopted the forgiving
legal standard for punitive damages favored by Mr. Gleave, and
both lower courts reviewed all the evidence on punitive damages
in a light most favorable to him before granting DRGW's Motion
For Directed Verdict.
Under all the circumstances, DRGW requests relief from
the Supreme Court for Mr. Gleave's bad faith.

Specifically,

DRGW seeks an order that DRGW does not have to pay any
post-judgment interest to Mr. Gleave from and after the
unconditional offer of settlement made to Mr. Gleave February

23, 1988. Additionally, DRGW seeks an award of double costs
and attorney's fees in connection with resisting Mr. Gleave
from and after February 23, 1988.

If requested by the Court,

DRGW will submit an affidavit on attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, DRGW urges this Court to
deny Mr. Gleavefs Petition for Certiorari.

This Court should

also grant DRGW's Motion to impose Rule 33 sanctions on Mr.
Gleave for a bad faith appeal.

In the alternative, if this

Court grants Mr. Gleavefs Petition, DRGW respectfully requests
that this Court also grant DRGWfs Cross-Petition for Certiorari.
DATED this

6? ~ day of June, 1988.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Michael F. Richman
Patrick J. O'Hara

By \ d ^

S Q\hv^^

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Respondents The Denver
and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company and Utah Railway Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF BY THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY ("DRGW) IN OPPOSITION TO ROBERT L. GLEAVE'S
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND DRGW'S ALTERNATIVE CROSS-PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI, were mailed, postage prepaid, this fc? -- day of
June, 1988, to the following:
Robert J. DeBry
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for the State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
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Telephone: (801) 533-7627
Attorney for DefendantRespondent Utah Department of
Transportation
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APPENDIX
Attached hereto are the following exhibits:
EXHIBIT "A": Gleave v. Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
EXHIBIT "B": Order Granting Directed Verdict
Regarding Punitive Damages
EXHIBIT "C": State of Utah Investigating Officer's
Report of Traffic Accident
EXHIBIT "D":
Motor Vehicles

Selected Utah Right-of-Way Statutes for

EXHIBIT "E"; Rules 33 and 43 of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court
EXHIBIT "F"; Letter dated March 30, 1988 from
counsel for DRGW to counsel for Mr. Gleave confirming DRGW's
unconditional offer of settlement and complaining about bad
faith delay from and after February 23, 1988
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We affirm, but remand for the purpose
of taking additional evidence of the value
of the fifty-foot strip and for entry of judgment accordingly. No costs awarded.
STEWART, Associate C.J., and
HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN,
JJ., concur.

Robert L. GLEAVE, Plaintiff and
Respondent and Cross-Appellant,
v.
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
and Utah Railway Company, a corporation, Defendants and Appellants and
Cross-Respondents,
and
State of Utah, Department of
Transportation, Defendant
and Respondent.
Nos. 86J)057-CA^860058-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 28, 1988.
Rehearing and Reconsideration
Denied Feb. 22, 1988.
Motorist brought action against railroad company and State Department of
Transportation for injuries sustained in collision with train. The Fourth District
Court, Utah County, Cullen Y. Christensen,
J., dismissed Department from case and
after trial entered judgment for motorist
and appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) statute
giving State Department of Transportation
ultimate responsibility for railroad crossing
design and warning and safety devices did
not relieve railroad of its duty to operate
trains with reasonable care and maintain
its right-of-way; (2) evidence was sufficient

to support finding that railroad breached
its duty of reasonable care to motorist and
that motorist was not contributorily negligent; and (3) installation, maintenance and
improvements of safety signals or devices
at railroad crossing was governmental
function immune from suit under state
Governmental Immunity Act.
Affirmed.
1. Railroads <s=>310
Statute giving State Department of
Transportation ultimate responsibility for
crossing design and warning and safety
devices at railroad crossing did not relieve
railroad company of duty to operate trains
with reasonable care, nor did it prohibit
railroad from exercising reasonable care in
operation of its trains^and maintenance of
its right-of-way. U.C.A.1953, 54-4-15(2, 4),
54-4-15.1.
2. Railroads <s=>348(5)
Expert testimony that due to crossing
angle, mound of earth, vegetation and
curving railroad track, driver proceeding
east on road could see only 285 feet of
track to north when stopped at existing
stop sign at railroad crossing, that train
that hit motorist's car was traveling at 50
miles per hour, the speed set by railroad,
and that driver with front end of his car
even with stop sign could not see train
moving at 50 miles per hour until it was
four seconds away from crossing was sufficient to support finding that railroad company breached its duty of reasonable care
and was negligent toward motorist struck
by train, notwithstanding fact that railroad
did install stop sign to supplement yellow
railroad crossing sign and X-shaped crossbuck.
3. Railroads «=>348(8)
Evidence was sufficient to support
finding that motorist exercised reasonable
care at railroad crossing by stopping vehicle at established stop sign and looking
for train and yet failed to see oncoming
train until it was too late to avoid collision,
and thus motorist was not contributorily
negligent in collision; motorist was not required to inch his car forward past estab-
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lished stop sign to stop second time in
narrow and precarious zone which afforded
no greater degree of safety when train
approaching at 50 miles per hour was close
but still out of view.
4. States e=> 112.2(2)
State Department of Transportation's
regulation of public safety needs and evaluation, installation, maintenance and improvement of safety signals and devices at
railroad crossings was governmental function immune from suit under state Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A.1953, 63-303.
5. States <3=>U2.2(2)
State Department of Transportation's
failure to install different safety signals or
devices at railroad crossing was purely discretionary function within meaning of discretionary function exception to waiver of
immunity under state Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10<lKa).
6. Damages <3=*208(8)
If there is no evidence to justify punitive damages, issue is properly withheld
from jury, but if reasonable inferences supporting judgment for losing party could be
drawn from evidence presented at trial,
directed verdict as to punitive damages
cannot be sustained, even if reasonable persons might reach different conclusions on
punitive damage issue after considering evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom.
7. Damages e=>91(l)
Before punitive damages may be
awarded, plaintiff must prove conduct that
is willful and malicious or that manifests
knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of, rights of others.
8. Damages <s=>91(3)
Evidence of simple negligence alone
does not support award of punitive damages.
9. Damages <S=>87(1)
General rule is that only compensatory
damages are appropriate and punitive damages may be awarded only in exceptional

10. Railroads <s==349
Railroad's failure to take corrective
steps to remedy dangerous conditions at
railroad crossing, which resulted in motorist sustaining serious injuries when struck
by train, was result of simple negligence,
and not result of either actual or implied
malice, and thus motorist was not entitled
to punitive damages.
11. Statutes <S=>181(1), 212.6
In construing legislation Court of Appeals must give effect to legislature's underlying intent, and assume that each term
in statute was used advisedly.
12. Statutes <3=>189
Court of Appeals will interpret and
apply statute according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused or
inoperable.
13. Statutes <s=»184
Proper construction of statute's terms
must further statute's purpose.
14. Interest <s=*39(2.5)
Statute providing for prejudgment interest limited special damages on which
prejudgment interest was recoverable to
those that arose in period between act giving rise to cause of action and entry of
judgment in plaintiff's favor, and did not
allow prejudgment interest on all types of
special damages such as those that would
arise subsequent to entry of judgment.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-44.

Robert J. Debry (argued), Robert J. Debry & Associates, Salt Lake City, for Robert L. Gleave.
E. Scott Savage (argued), Patrick J.
O'Hara, Michael F. Richman, Van Cott,
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake
City, for Denver & Rio Grande Western R.
Co.
William Bannon (argued), Paul Warner,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
UDOT.
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Before JACKSON, BENCH and
GARFF, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
This action arises from a collision between an eastbound motor vehicle driven
by Robert L. Gleave and an empty southbound coal train operated by an agent of
the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company. The accident occurred at daylight on April 16, 1982, at the crossing of
1600 South Street in Springville, Utah, and
the railroad tracks. Gleave suffered severe personal injuries, and his vehicle was
demolished. He filed this personal injury
action, and a jury awarded him damages of
$425,140.00 against the defendants Denver
& Rio Grande Western Railroad Company
and Utah Railway Company, which we will
refer to collectively as Rio Grande. The
jury did not attribute any negligence to
Gleave. Before trial, the Utah Department
of Transportation ("UDOT") was dismissed
from the case on sovereign immunity
grounds.
Rio Grande's appeal presents three substantial issues: ! (1) was Rio Grande relieved of its duty to Gleave because regulation and control of safety signals and devices at railroad-highway crossings is the
state's "exclusive" preempted domain? (2)
was Gleave negligent as a matter of law?
and (3) did the trial court err when it dismissed UDOT on grounds of sovereign immunity? Gleave has cross-appealed on two
points: (4) did the trial court erroneously
1. Rio Grande also claimed it was entitled to
have the jury instructed that it could reduce
Gleave's damages if it found that he failed to
mitigate his damages by not wearing a seat belt.
That issue was recently resolved adversely to
Rio Grande's position in Hillier v. hitnborn, 740
l\2d 300, 303-04 (Utah App.1987).
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2) and (4) (1986)
provide:
(2) The department shall have the power to
determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the
terms of installation, operation, maintenance,
use and protection ... of each crossing of a
public road or highway by a railroad or street
railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice
versa, and to alter or abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to

grant Rio Grande's motion for a directed
verdict on Gleave's claim for punitive damages? and (5) did the trial court err in
denying prejudgment interest on Gleave's
award of damages for lost future earnings
and earning capacity?
We affirm the judgment.
I. DUTY OF RAILROAD COMPANY
Rio Grande argues that "the joint jurisdiction of these state agencies [i.e., UDOT
and its reviewing agency, the Utah Public
Service Commission] over the signs and
control devices at railroad crossings remains exclusive and a private party, such
as a railroad, has no more right to change
the traffic protection signs at a public railroad crossing, than it would to change any
other signs on a public highway." Rio
Grande's "exclusivity" conclusion is based
on its interpretation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 54-4-15(2), (4) and 54-4-15.1 (1986).2 In
other words, Rio Grande claims it does not
have any duty to the public because the
duty has been preempted by the state.
Gleave argues that it makes no difference
who had the duty to install signs and signals at the collision crossing because that
issue was not presented to the jury and
because the jury decided that Rio Grande
breached duties other than a duty to install
better signs or control devices.
[11 Rio Grande's attempt to hide behind
the statutes motivates us to seek further.
Does not our law impose a basic duty of
reasonable care and prudence upon Rio
Grande, regardless of any statutory duty?
certain types of traffic in the interest of public
safety.. ..
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive
jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute
upon petition by any person aggrieved by anv
action of the department pursuant to this sec
tion.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 (1986) provides:
The Department of Transportation so as to
promote the public safety shall as prescribed
in this act provide lor the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of auto
malic and other safety appliances, signals or
devices at grade crossings on public highways
or roads over the tracks of any railroad or
street railroad corporation in the state.
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We think so In the landmark cas£ of
English v Southern Pac Co, 13 Utah 407,
45 P 47 (1896), the railway company
pressed the same argument The statute
in question imposed upon railway compa
nies the duty of ringing bells and sounding
whistles when trains approached public
crossings The railroad argued that timely
operation of bells and whistles was sufficient and "no additional duty was imposed
under any circumstances, [sic] to present
injury " Id at 416, 45 P at 49 Enroute
to adopting the general rule in English, the
supreme court observed
[I]n some cases it has been held that
before a jury will be warranted in saying, in the absence of any statutory direction to that effect, that a railroad
company should keep a flagman or gates
at a crossing, it must be shown that such
crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous
Id at 419, 45 P at 50 But the court ended
\te fcratym v a l v a lfcTT&ratYftg\ta£ "rtwre
than ordinarily hazardous" idea and held
instead that the reasonable care and prudence to be used must depend upon the
facts of each case
[Wjhile the statutes of Utah make some
provision for the safety of the public
while crossing tracks when crossing over
the public thoroughfares
, yet these
statutes will not relieve the railroad com
pany from adopting such other reasonable measures for the public safety as
common prudence may dictate, considering the danger, locality, travel, and
surrounding circumstances of the case
Id at 420, 45 P at 50 (emphasis added)
In Bridges v Union Pac R R Co, 26
Utah 2d 281, 488 P 2d 738 (1971), plaintiffs
focused on the English commentary and

argued that the railroad company was neg
ligent because the crossing was "more than
ordinarily hazardous" and the company
knew it but failed to install adequate sig
nals to warn the public of danger Appar
ently intrigued by that argument, the
Bridges court cited English, adopted the
commentary, and expanded the holding
To authorize a jury to find negligence
on the part of the railroad in not taking
additional precautions there must be evi
dence to indicate that the crossing was
more than ordinarily hazardous, 1 e,
there must be something in the configu
ration of the land, or in the construction
of the railroad, or in the structures in the
vicinity, or in the nature or amount of
the travel on the highway, or in other
conditions, which renders the warning
employed at the crossings inadequate to
warn the public of danger
Id at 283, 488 P 2d at 739 In a recent per
curiam decision of the Utah Supreme
Court, this "language from Bridget) was
quoted Hobbs v Denver & Rio Grande
W RR, 677 P2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1984)
Thus, the "more than ordinarily hazard
ous" doctrine rode the legal rails into rail
road crossing negligence law in Utah, and
we are required to apply that doctrine at
this time 3
We believe Gleave more accurately de
scribes what happened at trial The jury
was specifically instructed that UDOT was
statutorily given ultimate responsibility for
crossing design and warning and safety
devices and that, accordingly, it could not
find Rio Grande negligent "based upon any
defects which might exist with respect to
the design of the 1600 South crossing or
based upon any problems you may perceive
in the lack of traffic warning devices

. Although this doctrine is unnecessary and con
fusing, it makes tio difference iti the present
case See the unpublished opinion of U S Dis
tnct Judge Bruce A Jenkins in Wilde v Denver
& Rio Grande WRR Co, No C-83-149J, slip
op at 16 (DUt April 3 1985) [Available on
WESTLAW 1985 WL 17370)
In conclusion the court would be remiss if
it did not express its criticism of the doctrine
of the more than ordinarily hazardous'
crossing The Utah Supreme Court should, at
its first opportunity examine the doctrine
with an eye to eliminating it The court be

lieves that instructing a fact finder that it
cannot find a railroad negligent for operating,
a train through a crossing without taking ad
ditional precautions unless it first finds that
the warnings at the crossing were inadequate
to warn the public adds nothing—except per
haps confusion—to an instruction that the
railroad has a duty to operate its trains with
reasonable care If the warnings are ade
quate, a jury would find that a reasonable
person would not add additional warnings A
special doctrine is not necessary
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there. The jury proceeded to find that the
crossing in this case was "more than ordinarily hazardous." Once past that threshold, the jury was obligated to decide whether Rio Grande exercised reasonable care in
driving the train across this roadway, given
the crossing's design, its physical characteristics, and the existing warning signs.4
The statute relied upon by Rio Grande
does not relieve it of the duty to operate
trains with reasonable care, nor does it
prohibit Rio Grande from exercising reasonable care in the operation of its trains
and the maintenance of its right-of-way.
Rio Grande cannot ignore the public peril
at a more than ordinarily hazardous crossing and excuse itself until UDOT takes
action to upgrade the safety devices at the
1600 South crossing. Rio Grande remains
subject to a standard of reasonable care
which, under the circumstances at this
crossing, could require actions to reduce
the risks imposed on the public.
(2] Two experts testified that conditions at this crossing made it extraordinarily dangerous. Due to the crossing angle, a
mound of earth, vegetation, and a curving
track, a driver proceeding east on the road
could see only 285' of track to the north
when stopped at the existing stop sign.
Rio Grande admitted be&we trial that the
train that hit Gleave's car was travelling at
50 mph, the speed limit set by the railroad.
A driver with the front end of his car even
with the stop sign could not see a train
moving at 50 mph (approximately 74' per
second) until it was 4 seconds away from
the crossing. Moreover, an audiologist testified that a train whistle would not warn a
motorist until about 3 seconds before the
train crossed the road. The whistle sound
would be absorbed by the mound of earth
and vegetation in the curvature of the
track.
Rio Grande did install a stop sign to
supplement the round yellow railroad
4.

iRJighls and duties of a traveler and of" a
railroad company ai crossings are mutual and
reciprocal. . [A) railroad company, merely
because it is the favored traffic, [may not)
carelessly and heedlessly operate its trains
over crossings at an unusual and excessive
speed and without giving adequate warnings.

crossing sign and the X-shaped crossbuck.
But Rio Grande did not introduce evidence
of other affirmative action to reduce the
risks at this crossing, such as straightening
the track, lowering the dirt mound, removing obstructive vegetation, or lowering
train speed. The jury' could thus reasonably find that Rio Grande breached its duty
of reasonable care and was, therefore, negligent toward Gleave.
II. EVIDENCE OF GLEAVE'S LACK
OF NEGLIGENCE
. [3] In its special verdict, the jury specifically found no negligence on the part of
Gleave. Rio Grande filed a motion for a
new trial under Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(6),
claiming that the evidence was insufficient
to support this part of the verdict.
On appeal, the trial court's denial of Rio
Grande's motion must be sustained if there
is an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732
(Utah 1982). Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, we will
reverse the court's ruling only if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."
Id. (quoting
McCloud v. Bau?n, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127
(Utah 1977)).
Gleave testified that he pulled up to the
stop sign and stopped his vehicle. He then
looked to the left (north) and saw a dirt
mound with weeds on it and 50-100' of
track but no train approaching; then he
looked to the right (south), where he saw
no train in his unobstructed view three
hundred yards down the track. Making his
decision to proceed while still looking
southward, he began moving his vehicle
forward slowly and glanced back to the
left, seeing the train rapidly bearing down
on him and hearing its whistle for the first
or create a misleading set of circumstances
and rely upon the assumption that the traveling public may look out for their safety and
keep out of the way of the trains.
Toomer's hlstate v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah
37, 58-59, 239 P.2d 163, 173 (1951).
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time. At that point in time, which Gleave
estimated was 2-3 seconds before impact,
Gleave testified his car was 3-4' from the
track. Deciding he could not cross the
tracks safely in light of the train's speed,
Gleave braked. But by the time thtj car
stopped, it was approximately 1' from the
track. Although he then tried to put the
car in reverse, he was hit by the train
before he succeeded in shifting gears because the train engine overhangs the track
by considerably more than twelve inches.
Van Wagoner, an engineer who evaluates railroad crossing designs, testified
that the one at 1600 South in Springville is
the worst out of thousands of crossings he
had seen that were controlled with stop
signs. According to Van Wagoner, the
stop sign creates an expectancy in drivers
that, if they stop there, they will have
sufficient visibility of any hazard to allow
them to make a decision about proceeding
and sufficient time to then proceed and
clear the hazard. That expectancy is not
met at the subject crossing because a driver stopped at the stop sign, who does not
know the train's actual speed, can only see
285' up the track to the north. If the
driver sees no train coming from that direction, the decision is made to proceed
while continuing to be watchful for approaching trains. However, it takes a few
seconds to react and make this decision, a
few more for the car to accelerate, and a
few more to move the car over the tracks
a^d completely out of danger. According
to Van Wagoner, this process takes 9.1
seconds from the stop sign, based on conditions at this crossing. Such a driver is 100
percent certain to be hit by a train moving
at 50 mph (approximately 74' per second) if
the train is fewer than 670' away from the
crossing when the 9 J second process begins. Even if the driver could cross the
tracks in only 8 seconds, collision would be
inevitable if the 50 mph train was any
closer than 590' away when the process
began. The driver is trapped because, by
the time the 50 mph train is visible, there is
5.

We note that Utah law requires a driver approaching a railroad crossing to stop "within
fifty feet but not less than ten feet from the
nearest track of such railroad" when an ap-

not enough time to continue and cross the
tracks safely or to stop the car, change
gears, and back up out of the train's path.
On appeal, Gleave does not deny that he
had a duty to exercise reasonable care in
operating his vehicle over the railroad
crossing; instead, he says the evidence
shows he carried out that duty.
The law requires that a traveler, approaching a railroad crossing, look and
listen, and, if necessary, stop to avoid
being injured by trains. This is his duty
at all times and on all occasions, whether
his view be obstructed or unobstructed,
and the greater the hazard or danger
surrounding him, the greater is the care
required of him.
Lundquist v. Kennccott Copper Co., 30
Utah 2d 262, 266, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184
(1973). Rio Grande argues that Gleave's
own testimony shows him to be negligent
as a matter of law because he did not stop
a second time at a point where he was close
enough to the track to see further northward, but far enough from the track that a
passing train would still clear the front end
of his car.
A plaintiff is contributorily negligent
as a matter of law, if all reasonable
minds would conclude that he failed to
use the degree of care which an ordinary,
reasonable, and prudent person would
have observed for his own safety under
the circumstances.
Id. at 266, 516 P.2d at 1185. Based on all
the evidence in the record, we hold that
Gleave's conduct was not negligent as a
matter of law. All reasonable minds would
not necessarily conclude that Gleave failed
to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances he faced.
Van Wagoner testified that a driver who
moved his car several feet beyond the stop
sign and stopped with the front end at a
spot 10' from the rail could still only see
northward 285', resulting in no gain in
sight distance.5 From that spot, the "reaction, decision, acceleration, and clearance"
proaching train "is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing." Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-95(a)(4) (1982) (emphasis added).
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process would still take 8.6 seconds, resulting inevitably in a collision with an unseen
50 mph train up to 636' away when the
process began, as discussed above.
Gleave's crossing design expert, Mitchell,
stated it was possible to stop a car beyond
the stop sign and have a clear view northward 440' up the track, providing approximately 6 seconds to cross the tracks before
a train farther away than that could reach
the crossing. But in this position, "very
close" to the track, a passing train would
just miss the front end of the stopped car
because the train engine is nearly 5' wider
than the track.
Van Wagoner testified that a driver who
stopped with the front of his car 4' from
the track and then proceeded—upon seeing
no oncoming train—would still take approximately 7 seconds to react, decide, and
move across safely, making a collision inevitable if a 50 mph train was out of sight but
fewer than 518' away when the process
began.
Rio Grande's accident reconstruction expert, Limpert, testified that it was physically possible to stop a car at a safe point only
7' from the rail, but he did not testify to
the length of the sight distance northward
from that point. In his testimony, Limpert
forcefully ch*llenge<sUthe validity of the
assumptions and factors used in Van Wagoner's calculations, e.g., the maximum
speed possible given the track's condition
and the inclusion of decision and reaction
time in the computations. Limpert also
provided his expert opinion, illustrated by a
videotape of a car being driven over the
crossing from a standstill and from various
distances away, that the times necessary to
cross safely were roughly one-third of the
estimates given by Van Wagoner. However, it was for the jury to give these
conflicting opinions whatever weight it
deemed appropriate. Groen v. Tri-0-Inc.t
667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983).
We decline to hold that, as a matter of
law, all reasonable persons would conclude
Gleave's duty at this dangerous crossing
was to inch his car forward past the established stop sign to stop a second time in
this narrow and precarious zone which af-

forded no greater degree of safety when a
train approaching at 50 mph was close but
still out of view. Cf. Seybold v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 70-71, 239 P.2d
174, 179 (1951) (plaintiff either failed to
look, looked but failed to see what was
there, or looked and failed to see the oncoming train because blinded by lights but
proceeded anyway); Drummond v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., I l l Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903,
906 (1947) (plaintiff would have had clear
view of 25-30 mph train if she had stopped
in a place "which afforded her both safety
and an opportunity to look").
There is substantial evidence on which a
jury could reasonably base a finding that
Gleave exercised reasonable care under the
circumstances and yet failed to see the
oncoming train until it was too late to avoid
the collision. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court's denial of Rio Grande's motion
for a new trial.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Gleave alleged in his complaint that
UDOT breached its statutory duty under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-14 through 15.1
(1986) to install, maintain and improve safety signals and devices at the 1600 South
railroad crossing in Springville. Although
there was a yellow warning sign, a crossbuck, and a stop sign at this crossing, he
claimed that UDOT knew or should have
known of the unreasonably dangerous condition there and that it negligently failed to
install "adequate" safety signals or devices.
The trial court granted UDOT's motion
to dismiss the complaint based on sovereign immunity. In so ruling, the court
stated that "the decision of whether or not
to install a safety signal at a particular
crossing is a discretionary one protected by
the Governmental Immunity Act," impliedly holding that the allegedly negligent
actions of UDOT constituted a governmental function protected by the grant of immunity in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3
(1986).
On appeal, Rio Grande makes two arguments challenging this ruling: (1) UDOT's
regulation of traffic warning devices at

GLEAVE v. DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN R.

Utah

667

CUe a* 749 P 2d 660 (Utah App 1986)

railroad crossings is not a "governmental
function" within the purview of section 6 3 80-3 and, therefore, UDOT is not immune
from suit, and (2) the trial court erroneously concluded that UDOTs failure to install
different safety devices at the subject
crossing fell within the "discretionary function" exception to the waiver of immunity
in Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10(1) (1986) 6

the operation of a public gclf course is not
a governmental function
Id
The next year, in Johnson v Salt Lake
City Corp, 629 P 2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981),
the court explained "The first part of the
Standiford test—activity of such a unique
nature that it can only be performed b\ a
governmental agencv,—does not refer to
what government may do, but to what
government alone rnust do "
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the
Standiford
test numerous times, conclud
ing that the maintenance of traffic control
devices, 7 supervision of financial institu
tions, 8 the issuance of motor vehicle titles
and ownership recordkeeping responsibili
ties, 9 and supervision of subdivision de\el
opment and canal fence construction ,0 are
governmental functions within the meaning
of the Act Supervision of disbursement of
escrowed funds, n the provision of winter
recreational areas on a public golf course, 12
and the operation of a sewage system n
have been held not to be governmental
functions

A GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
[4] The Utah Governmental Immunity
Act ("Act") states that, ' [ejxcept as may
be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the
exercise of a governmental function
Utah Code Ann § 63-30-3 (1986)
In
Standiford
v Salt Lake City Corp, 605
P 2d 1230 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme
Court abandoned the "governmental versus
proprietary function" analysis previously
used in deciding whether an entity was
immune from suit for injuries resulting
from a particular activity In doing so, the
court recognized that the Act does not expressly or impliedly set up such a dichotomy and that the results of the application
of this analysis had been inconsistent and
unpredictable
See id at 1232-35 The
court articulated a new test and redefined
a governmental function as an activity "of
such a unique nature that it can only be
performed by a governmental agency or
that it is essential to the core of governmental activity " Id at 1237 Under the
new test, the Standiford
court concluded

UDOT is statutorily empowered to "pro
vide for the installing, maintaining, recon
structing, and improving of automatic and
other safety appliances, signals or devices
at grade crossings," Utah Code Ann
§ 54-4-15 1 (1986), and to apportion costs
of such projects among public and private
entities
Utah Code Ann § 54-4-15 3
(1986) The government alone must con
sistently regulate safety devices at railroad
crossings, determine which devices at
which crossings should be recommended

6.

8. Madsen i Borthick, 658 P 2d 627 (Utah 1983)

In his cross appeal, Gleave did not challenge
the trial court s dismissal of UDOT
Rio
Grande, in both its opposition to UDOTs pre
trial motion to dismiss and ir its appeal to this
court, has not contended that Gleave s injury
was caused by UDOTs creation of a dangerous
condition on a road, for which immunity is
expressly waived in Utah Code Ann § 63-30-8
(1986) This separate waiver provision is not
subject to the disci etionary function" exception
in section 63-30-10(1) Sanford \ University of
Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285 488 P 2d 741, 745 (1971)
See Richards v Leavttt, 716 P 2d 276, 278 (Utah
1985) (per curiam), Bigelow v Ingersoll, 618
P2d 50, 54 n 3 (Utah 1980)

7. Richards i Ua\itt
(per curiam)

716 P 2d 276 (Utah 1985)

9

Metropolitan Fin Co \ State, 714 P 2d 2^3
(Utah 1986 > (per curiam)

10. Loveland v Orem Citv Corp, 746 P 2d 763
(1987)
11. Cox v Utah Mortg & Loan Co, 716 P 2d 783
(Utah 1986)
12. Johnson \ Salt Lake City Corp, 629 P 2d 432
(Utah 1981)
13 Dalton \ Salt Lake Sub San Dtst, 676 P 2d
399 (Utah 1984) Thomas v Clearfield Cm 642
P2d 737 (Utah 1982)
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and decisions taking place at the operational level, or, in other words, " . . . those
which concern routine, everyday matters,
not requiring evaluation of broad policy
factors."
Frank, 613 P.2d at 520.
More recently, in Little v. Utah State
Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah
1983), the court adopted the following test
for distinguishing between functions at the
policy-making level from those at the operational level, requiring affirmative answers
to four preliminary questions in order for
an act to be purely discretionary:
B. DISCRETIONARY
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
decision necessarily involve a basic gov[5] In light of this holding, we must
ernmental policy, program, or objective?
next determine whether UDOT's allegedly
(2)
Is the questioned act, omission, or
negligent failure to install different safety
decision
essential to the realization or
signals at the 1600 South crossing in
accomplishment
of that policy, program,
Springville is a "discretionary function"
or
objective
as
opposed to one which
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.
would
not
change
the course or direction
§ 63-30-10(l)(a), an exception to the waiver
of
the
policy,
program,
or objective?
of immunity in that statutory section:
(3)
Does
the
act,
omission,
or decision
(1) Immunity from suit of all governrequire
the
exercise
of
basic
policy
evalumental entities is waived for injury proxiation,
judgment,
and
expertise
on
the
mately caused by a negligent act or omispart
of
the
governmental
agency
insion of an employee committed within the
volved?
scope of employment except if the injury:
(4) Does the governmental agency in(a) arises out of the exercise or pervolved possess the requisite constitutionformance *0r the faflure to exercise or
al, statutory, or lawful authority and
perform a discretionary function,
duty to do or make the challenged act,
whether or not the discretion is
omission, or decision?
abused[.]
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that Id. at 51.
this "discretionary function" exception was
With regard to the case before us, the
"intended to shield those governmental first question presented by Little must be
acts and decisions impacting on large num- answered affirmatively. The basic governbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable mental objective involved in "installing,
ways from individual and class legal ac- maintaining, reconstructing, and improvtions, the continual threat of which would ing" safety devices is the consistent promake public administration all but impossi- motion of public safety, a basic government
ble." Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 objective. Evaluating all of the approxi(Utah 1980). The Frank court noted its mately 1,280 railroad crossings in the state
prior observation, in Carroll v. State Road and assigning priorities for safety signal
Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 384, 388, 496 P.2d upgrades is essential to the realization of
888, 891 (1972), that virtually all acts re- the protection of public safety, especially in
quire the exercise of some degree of discre- light of the fact that there are not unlimittion and that the statutory exception ed funds available to upgrade all needy
should thus be confined to those decisions crossings at once. Thus, the second quesand acts occurring at the "basic policy-mak- tion of the Little test must also be answering level," and not extended to those acts ed affirmatively.
for federal funding, rank crossings in order
of need for upgrading in light of limited
funds for that purpose, and apportion signal installation costs between public and
private entities. As a practical matter, the
private sector cannot perform these functions. Accordingly, we hold that the regulation of public safety needs and the evaluation, installation, maintenance and improvement of safety signals or devices at
railroad crossings is a governmental function immunized from suit under section 6330-3 of the Act.
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UDOT exercises "basic policy evaluation,
judgment, and expertise" when evaluating
railroad crossings for safety signal improvements and when deciding which crossings should have upgraded safety appliances first. In applying UDOT's safety
policy, UDOT's surveillance team performs
on-site inspections and weighs the numerous factors relating to crossing safety.
The team consists of transportation experts
who exercise their collective judgment and
expertise in making their evaluations of the
relative dangerousness of railroad crossings in Utah, taking into consideration their
physical characteristics and configurations,
the volume and type of vehicular and train
traffic, and other relevant factors. Thus,
the third Little question must be answered
affirmatively.
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 et
seq. (1986) empowers UDOT with the authority to supervise and regulate the safety
of aJl the State's railroad crossings, including the authority to provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of safety devices and signals there.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 (1986).
UDOT clearly has the legal authority to
use the monies available for safety signal
improvement at the most dangerous crossings first, which means that other less dangerous crossings, such as this one, must
await their turn for improvement. Thus,
the answer to the fourth Little question is
affirmative.
We therefore hold that UDOTs failure
to install different safety signals or devices
at the subject crossing was a purely discretionary function within the meaning of section 63-30-10(1 )(a).
Prior Utah case law supports this conclusion. In Velasquez v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970), the
Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah
Public Service Commission's alleged failure
to require better warning devices at a railroad crossing involved the exercise of a
discretionary function for which immunity
was not waived. The Velasquez plaintiff, a
passenger in a pickup truck hit by a train,
claimed that the state agency was liable for
failing to require additional safety devices

at the crossing. Affirming summary judgment in the agency's favor, the court concluded that the statutory- directive to the
PSC to prescribe the installation of "appropriate" safety or other devices by the railroad company (under a prior version of
section 54-4-14) indicated a legislative intent to confer discretion on the responsible
agency at the time, i.e., the Public Service
Commission:
The statute gives the respondent [PSC]
the power to require a different safety
device at the crossing in question, but
that does not mean that the plaintiff
should recover simply because a better
warning signal could or should have been
installed. The Public Service Commission has the discretion to require the
installation of such signals as in its judgment the health or safety of employees,
passengers, customers oir the public may
require.
Id. at 218, 469 P.2d at 6.
We find no merit in Rio Grande's argument that Velasquez has been overruled by
Slandiford and Bigclow v. Jngcrsoll, 618
P.2d 50 (Utah 1980). As previously noted,
Standiford overruled only those cases applying the "governmental versus proprietary function" analysis in deciding whether
or not section 63-30-3 immunity applied to
the allegedly injurious activity in the first
place. In Velasquez, the court did not apply the later discredited mode of analysis;
instead, it merely assumed there was a
governmental function and focused solely
on the applicability of the discretionary
function exception. Similarly, in Bigclow,
the court applied the "basic policy-making
level versus operational level" distinction
set forth in Frank, discussed above, and
concluded that the design of the street
traffic control system did not involve decisions and acts at the basic policy-making
level and, therefore, was not a discretionary function within section 63-30-10(1).
Bigelow, 618 P.2d at 53.
However, as stated above, the allegedly
negligent omission in this case does involve
decisions and acts at the basic policy-making level. The trial court thus correctly
concluded that UDOTs failure to install
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different safety devices or signals at the
1600 South crossing in Springville comes
within the discretionary function exception
of section 63-30-10(l)(si). We therefore affirm the dismissal of the complaint against
UDOT.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM
Gleave alleged that Rio Grande had
knowledge of dangerous conditions at the
crossing and "willfully or recklessly failed
to take any corrective steps." At the close
of Gleave's evidence, Rio Grande moved for
a directed verdict on Gleave's punitive damage claim because of insufficiency of the
evidence. Rio Grande argued that there
was not one scintilla of evidence of willful
or malicious activity on its part. Gleave
agreed there was no proof of actual malice,
hut argued there was sufficient evidence of
reckless conduct for the jury to imply malice.
The trial court granted Rio Grande's motion and withdrew the punitive damage issue from the jury's consideration; however, it is not clear whether that ruling was
based on inadequate evidence of actual
malice or implied malice.
16] In reviewing the correctness of the
trial court's grant of a directed verdict to
Rio Grande on Gleave's punitive damage
claim, we must view the^evidence in the
light most favorable to him, the party
against whom the motion was made. Kim
v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah
1980). If there is no evidence to justify
punitive damages, the issue was properly
withheld from the jury. Tripp v. Baglcy,
75 Uuih 42, 282 P. W26 (1929). Jf, however, reasonable inferences supporting
judgment for the losing party could be
drawn from the evidence presented at trial,
the directed verdict cannot be sustained.
Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641
P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982); Kim, 610 P.2d
at 1271. This is so even if reasonable
14. Wc note that the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 908 (1979) slates:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than
compensatory or nominal damages, awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.

persons might reach different conclusions
on the punitive damage issue after considering the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom. See Little America
Refining Co., 641 P.2d at 114.
[7] Before punitive damages may be
awarded, the plaintiff must prove conduct
that is willful and malicious or that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and disregard of, the rights of
others. Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330,
337 (Utah 1985); Synergetics v. Marathon
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1112-13
(Utah 1985); Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d
80, 84 (Utah App.1987).
18] Jn our review of Rio Grande's duty
of care, we noted substantial evidence from
which a jury could reasonably conclude
that Rio Grande was negligent. But evidence of simple negligence alone does not
support an award of punitive damages.
Punitive damages should be awarded
infrequently.
Simple negligence will
never suffice as a basis upon which such
damages may be awarded. "[They] are
not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like,
which constitute ordinary negligence."
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675
P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 comment
b (1979)).u
In Behrens, the Utah Supreme Court
identified three elements of the type of
conduct that will support an award of punitive damages against a defendant in a negligence action who acts "maliciously or in
reckless disregard for the rights of others." Although actual intent to cause injury is not necessary,
the defendant must either know or
should know "that such conduct would,
[1] in a high degree of probability, result
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for
conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others . . .
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in substantial harm to another," Dancutovxch v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 193
(1979), and [2] the conduct must be
"highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, [3]
in a situation where a high degree of
danger is apparent" Id. at 191.
Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186-87 (numbering
added).
We now evaluate the evidence presented
by Gleave in light of these three elements:
(1) High degree of probability. There
was uncontroverted testimony that there
had been no accidents at this crossing up to
the time of UDOT's inspection and evaluation in 1974. After that time, Rio Grande
installed stop signs as a temporary measure until UDOT upgraded the crossing
with flashing red lights. Gleave's attorney
claimed he would offer evidence at trial of
"near misses" at the crossing, but none
was produced. The locality was rural, and
the road not heavily travelled. There is no
evidence that Rio Grande knew or should
have known of the facts discovered by
Gleave's experts after this accident. In
any event, the evidence shows a low degree
of probability.
(2) Highly unreasonable conduct or extreme departure from ordinary care. At
worst, the evidence shows errors of judgment, i.e., ordinary negligence on the part
of Rio Grande, in failing to take steps to
reduce the risks at this crossing. There is
n^evidence of an extreme departure from
ordinary care.
(3) High degree of danger apparent. A
degree of danger exists at every railroad
crossing. The evidence showed the degree
of danger at this crossing was high. The
crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous. But, was the extent of that danger
readily apparent prior to this accident?
Perhaps reasonable minds could differ concerning this prong of the Behrens test, but
the first two prongs remain unsatisfied.
[9,10] Moreover, the general rule is
that only compensatory damages are appropriate and that punitive damages may
be awarded only in exceptional cases.
Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186. The evidence

shows nothing exceptional about Rio
Grande's conduct in this case.
Furthermore, punitive damages should
be awarded only when they will clearly
accomplish a public objective not accomplished by the award of compensatory
damages.... The intended deterrent effect must be clear and in proportion to
the nature of the wrong and the possibility of recurrence.
Id. at 1187. Gleave has not directed our
attention to any public objective which
would clearly be accomplished by an award
of punitive damages herein. Where the
wrong is the result of simple negligence,
there is nothing to deter. We believe the
substantial compensatory award will provide ample motivation for Rio Grande to
take appropriate measures to protect the
public and itself from a recurrence of this
unfortunate accident.
There is no evidence of malice, actual or
implied, that would justify an award of
punitive damages against Rio Grande. The
trial court thus properly withheld that issue from the jury.
V. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In the special verdict returned in this
case, the jury awarded Gleave the following itemized damages:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Past medical expenses
Future medical expenses
Past lost wages
Loss of future earnings and earning capacity
General Damages
Market value of Gleave vehicle
Total

$56,000
$22,540
$20,000
$275,000
$50,000
$1,600
$425,140

The trial court granted Gleave's post-trial
motion to amend his complaint to include a
claim for prejudgment interest on items A,
C, and D, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-^4 (1987). Gleave's request for
prejudgment interest on items A and C was
granted, but the court denied prejudgment
interest on item D.
It is true, as Gleave asserts, that lost
future earning capacity is a special damage
insofar as pleading requirements are concerned. Cohnv.J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d
306, 308 (Utah 1975). But we must still
decide whether section 78-27-44 authorizes
prejudgment interest on all types of special
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damages, whether they arise before or after entry of a plaintiff's personal injury
judgment.
[11-13] In construing this legislation,
we must give effect to the legislature's
underlying intent, American
Coal Co. v.
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984), and
assume that each term in the statute was
used advisedly. West Jordan v. Morrison,
656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). We will
interpret and apply the statute according to
its literal wording unless it is unreasonably
confused or inoperable. Id.; Home v.
Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App.1987).
A proper construction of its terms must
further the statute's purposes. RDG Assocs./Jorman
Corp.
v.
Industrial
Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah 1987).
[14] The statute provides:
In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by
any person, resulting from or occasioned
by the tort of any other person, corporation, association or partnership, whether
by negligence or willful intent of that
other person, corporation, association or
partnership, and whether that injury
shall have resulted fatally or otherwise,
it shall be lawful for the plaintiff in the
complaint to claim interest on the special
damages alleged from the date of the
occur re? fee of the act gimng rise to the
cause of action and it shall be the duty
of the court, in entering judgment for
plaintiff in that action, to add to the
amount of damages assessed by the verdict of the jury . .. interest on that
amount calculated at 8'A per annum from
the date of the occurrence of the act
giving rise to the cause of action to the
date of entering the judgment, and to
include it in that judgment.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 (1987) (emphasis added). We agree with Rio Grande that
this emphasized phrase clearly modifies
"special damages," limiting those special
damages on which prejudgment interest is
recoverable to those that arise in the period
between the act giving rise to the cause of
action and entry of judgment in plaintiff's
favor.

This interpretation of the statute furthers its purpose, as documented in its
legislative history. When first introduced
at the 1975 Legislature by Senator Renstrom as Senate Bill 153 and later passed
by the Senate, the word "special" was not
in the proposed statute; prejudgment interest was to be awarded a successful plaintiff on all "damages alleged from the date
of the occurrence of the a c t . . . . "
Utah
Senate Tr. of 3rd Reading of S.B. 153,
February 20, 1975.
At the bill's second and third reading in
the House of Representatives, however,
there was a lengthy discussion of the problems with such a broad prejudgment interest provision. Utah House of Reps. Tr. of
2nd and 3rd Reading of S.B. 153, March
13, 1975. Some legislators voiced their
concerns about accrual of interest on damages in a malpractice action where the
cause of action did not even accrue until
discovery of the injury, possibly many
years after the date the injurious act occurred. A similar concern was voiced regarding injured minors who waited until
after reaching majority age before bringing their lawsuits; under the proposed statute, interest could accrue for many years.
Others feared the effect such a law would
have on doctors' malpractice insurance
rates and on all casualty insurance premiums in the state.
Toward the end of the House debate.
Representative Fisher offered an amendment to add the word "special" before the
word "damages" in the bill, explaining that
special damages are the expenses paid for
those who are injured so they can immediately receive necessary medical and hospi
tal care. He added that special damages
are
those expenses that they have paid out of
pocket, for which they have used their
own money and which they will not get
until the settlement of their action. Getting interest on their out-of-pocket expenses will proinde a total
recoupment
of any expenses that they have had
from the time of the accident until they
are paid in full by a recovery at court
or by settlement. I believe it's a reasonable and a very logical amendment that
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interest on special damages be endorsed
by us, and in that form we will pass the
intent of the bill of paying for all expenses until such time as judgment is
rendered, and we will not be assessing
an interest on something that neither of
the parties know.
Id. (emphasis added). In its amended form,
Senate Bill 153 then passed in the House
by five votes. When the amended bill was
returned to the Senate later the same day,
Senator Renstrom made a motion that the
Senate concur in the House amendment.
After that motion passed, the amended bill
passed the Senate with no further discussion. Utah Senate Tr. of Vote on S.B.
153, March 13, 1975.
The legislative history and the statutory
language reveal the legislature's intent to
distinguish between special damages accruing between the date of the injurious act
and the entry of judgment (such as medical
expenses or lost wages) and those (such as
lost future earnings and future earning
capacity) that will arise subsequent to en15. The latter type is, of course, subject to the
statutory interest rate on judgments in Utah

Utah
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try of judgment, and to authorize prejudgment interest only on the former category
of special damages.15 The trial court thus
properly denied Gleave prejudgment interest under section 78-27-44 on that portion
of damages in the special jury verdict designated as "lost future earnings and earning capacity.'*
CONCLUSION
We have considered the other issues
raised by Rio Grande and find them meritless. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. Costs are awarded only to
UDOT.
GARFF and BENCH, JJ.(1 concur.

Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1986).
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
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965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. GLEAVE,
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING
DIRECTED VERDICT
REGARDING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES

vs.
DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
GERALD H. BURTON, an
individual, CITY OF
SPRINGVILLE, a Municipal
corporation, and STATE OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

Civil No. 62912
(Judge Cullen Y. Christensen)

Defendants.

At the close of plaintiff's case (June 18, 1984),
defendant moved for an order granting a directed verdict
with respect to the issue of punitive damages.
For reasons set forth in the record, the directed
verdict is granted with respect to punitive damages only.
The issue of compensatory damages is specifically
reserved for the jury.
(/-

DATED this /S " day of

, 1984.

BY THE COURT:

0,w : .
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SPRINCVILLB CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

NARRATIVE RErutu

™L,E *

,

:AT£ AND TIKI* THIS REPORT

16APR82

TYPE OF REPORT

82-379

T/C

0630hrs.

16APR82 0630hrs. I was dipatched to a "possible train vehicle" collision, location
unk. at

the "south end of town1'

700 South

and "around 700 South."

I checked the area of

and 800 South Main St, and was then directed to the railroad yard on

400 West. As I checked that location, the actual location was relayed to me as
1600 South Main st..

Upon arrival I confirmed need for an ambulance with dispatch

and attended to the driver (injured party). Driver was conscious and
rational inspite of his injuries.

I obtained information as to identity of driver

and then asked him what had happened.
information:

seemed

Driver, Robert Gleave, gave me the following

Driver was E/B on 1600 South. He stated that he "slowed down" at

the stop sign and looked to the south. He did not see any train. He then turned
to look north. When he did he saw the train "right on top of" him. He said
that he tried evasive action (stopping and backing) but was unable to avoid
collision. Driver did not know how he was ejected from the vehicle. Ambulance
personnel then arrived and attended to Driver.
1 then contacted the conductor, C.E. Connors, who gave the following information
to me: The train (owned and operated by Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad)
uas on an eastbound route (south bound at the point of impact) at approx. 50
(fifty) miles per hour. As they approached the intersection of 1600 South, they
observed the vehicle (V-1) pull out too far into the intersection before stopping,
and into the path of their train.

The train was a 33 (thirty three) car diesel

which was running empty at the time.
The following measurements were taken at the scene: Width of total roadway
at intersection with RR tracks—21*5" .

Distance from south edge of roadway to

approx. i>01—7'9". Distance POT to POR—29 , 0". Distance vch to tracks approx.3'.
driver was located between the veh. and the tracks.

SPRINC^ILLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
NARRATIVE

REPORT

PAfiF *

2

DATE AND TIKI: THIS REPCPT

J6APR82

0630hrs,

IHPE
or REPORT
£ OF

I

82-379

T/C

Driver was transported by ambulance to Mountain View Hospital, with multiple
injuries to torso, head, leg (area of left knee) and left foot.

Vehicle, a 1975 Chev Monza appeared to be totaled, all windshields and side
windows, appeared in tact with the exception of the drivers side window which was
down (probable point of ejection.)

Unknown at time of report whether the train engineer had activated his
horn as audible signal as he was approaching the intersection.
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UTAH CODE
1987-1988

to change lanes shall be given continuously for at
least the last three seconds preceding the beginning
of the turn or change.
Article 8. Turns and Signals on Starting,
(2) A person may not stop or suddenly decrease
the speed of a vehicle without first giving an apprStopping or Turning
opriate signal to the operator of any vehicle imme41-6-66. Taming - Manner • Traffic-control devices.
diately to the rear when there is opportunity to give
41-6-67. Turning around - Where prohibited a signal.
Visibility.
(3) The signals required on vehicles by Section 4141-6-69. Moving a veiiick - Safety.
41-6-69. Turning or changing lanes • Safety • Signals
6-70 may not be flashed o n one side only on a
- Stopping or sudden decrease in speed • Signal
disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do pass'
Hashing - Where prohibited.
to operators o f other vehicles approaching from the
41-6-70. Signals - Methods.
rear, or flashed on one side only of a parked vehicle
41-6-71. Signals - How made.
except as necessary to comply with this section. 1*87
41-6-70. Signals - Methods.
41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control
A stop or turn signal when required shall be given
devices.
either by the hand and arm or by signal lamps.
iff?
The operator of a vehicle shall make turns as 41-6-71. Signals - How made.
follows:
Signals required to be given by hand and arm
(1) Right turns: both a right turn and an approach
for a right turn shall be made as close as practical to shall be given from the left side of the vehicle as
follows:
the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.
(1) Left turn: hand and arm extended horizont(2) Left turns: the operator of a vehicle intending
ally;
to turn left shall approach the turn from the
(2) Right turn: hand and arm extended upward!
extreme left-hand lane for traffic moving in the
same direction. Whenever practicable, the left turn and
(3) Stop or decrease speed: hand and arm exteshall be made by turning onto the roadway being
1987
entered in the extreme left-hand lane for traffic nded downward.
moving in the new direction, unless otherwise dire- Article 9. Right-of-way
cted by an official traffic-control device.
(3) Two-way left turn lanes: where a special lane 41-6-72. Unregulated Intersection - Right-of-way
between vehicles.
for making left turns by operators proceeding in
Right of way - Stop or yield signals opposite directions has been indicated by official 41-6-72.10.
Collisions at intersections or Junctions of roadways traffic-control devices:
Evidence.
(a) a left turn may not be made from any other 41-6-73. Vehicle turning left - Yield right-of-way.
lane; and
41-6-74. Repealed.
(b) a vehicle may not be driven in the lane 41-6-74.10. Repealed. %
except when preparing for or making a left turn 41-6-75. Entering or crossing highway other than from
another roadway - Yield right-of-way.
from or into the roadway or when preparing for or
41-6-75.5. Merging lanes - Yielding.
making a U-turn when permitted by law.
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals (4) The Department o f Transportation and local
Duties of respective drivers.
authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause 41-6-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon highway
official traffic-control devices to be placed and
- Right of way.
require and direct that a different course from that
specified in this section be traveled by turning veh- 41-6-72. Unregulated intersection icles. The operator of a vehicle may not turn a
Right-of-way between vehicles.
vehicle other than as directed by those devices. 1987
(1) Except as specified in Subsection (2), when
41-6-67. Turning around - Where prohibited more than one vehicle enters or approaches an
Visibility.
unregulated or an all-way stop intersection from
(1) The operator of any vehicle may not turn the different highways at approximately the same time,
vehicle to proceed in the opposite direction unless the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the
the movement can be made safely and without int- right-of-way to the vehicle o n the right unless
erfering with other traffic.
otherwise directed by a peace officer.
(2) A vehicle may not be turned to proceed in the
(2) When approaching an unregulated intersection
opposite direction on any curve, or upon the appr- the operator of a vehicle on a highway that does not
oach to, or near the crest of a grade, if the vehicle is continue beyond the intersection shall yield the rightnot visible at a distance of 500 feet by the operator of-way to the operator o f any vehicle on the inteof any other vehicle approaching from either direc- rsecting highway.
1917
tion.
1987 41-6-72.10. Right-of-way - Stop or yield
41-6-68. Moving a vehicle - Safety.
signals • Yield - Collisions at intersections or
A person may not move a vehicle which is
junctions of roadways - Evidence.
stopped, standing, or parked until the movement
(1) Preferential right-of-way may be indicated
may be made with reasonable safety.
tm by stop signs or yield signs under Section 41-641-6-69. Turning or changing lanes - Safety 99.
Signals - Stopping or sudden decrease in speed
(2) Except when directed to proceed by a peace
- Signal flashing - Where prohibited.
officer, every operator of a vehicle approaching a
OXa) A person may not turn a vehicle or move stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line,
right or left upon a roadway or change lanes until but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the
the movement can be made with reasonable safety near side of the intersection, but if none, then at a
and an appropriate signal has been given.
point nearest the intersecting roadway where the
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or operator has a view of approaching traffic on the
on which the regulations or prohibitions are applicable,
im

550
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intersecting roadway before entering it After having
stopped, the operator shall yield the right-of-way
to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on
another roadway so closely as to constitute an
immediate hazard dunng the time when the operator
is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. The operator shall yield the rightof-way to pedestnans within an adjacent crosswalk.
(3Xa) The operator of a vehicle approaching a
yield sign shall slow down to a speed reasonable for
the existing conditions and if required for safety,
shall stop as provided under Subsection (2)
(b) After slowing or stopping, the operator shall
yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so
closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during
the time the operator is moving across or within the
intersection or junction of roadways The operator
shall yield to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk. If the operator is involved in a collision with a
vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways
or with a pedestrian at an adjacent crosswalk, after
passing a yield sign without stopping, the collision is
prima facie evidence of the operator's failure to
yield the right-of-way, but is not considered
negligence per se in determining liability for the
accident.
wrr
41-6-73. Vehicle turning left - Yield
right-of-way.
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the
left shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction which is so
close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an
immediate hazard
\m
41-6-74. Repealed.
i*7
41-6-74.10. Repealed.
i«7
41-6-75. Entering or crossing highway other than
from another roadway - Yield right-of-way.
The operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross
a highway from any place other than another
highway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered or
crossed
IW7
41-6-75.5. Merging lanes - Yielding.
The operator of a vehicle traveling in a lane that
is about to merge into another lane shall yield the
right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the lane
or lanes into which the lane of the operator is
merging and which J&e so close as to be an immediate hazard This section does not apply to entry
lanes to limited access highways
i9t7
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals
- Duties of respective drivers.
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using audible or visual
signals under Sections 41-6-14, 41-6-132, or 416-146 or o f a peace officer vehicle lawfully using
an audible or visual signal, the operator of every
other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and
immediately move to a position parallel to, and as
close as possible to, the right hand edge or curb o f
the highway, clear of any intersection and shall stop
and remain there until the authonzed emergency
vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed
by a peace officer
(2) This section does not relieve the operator o f
an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to
drive with regard for the safety of all persons using
the highway
19«7

41-6-79.

41-6-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon
highway - Right-of-way.
The operator o f a vehicle shall yield the right-ofway to a n y
(1) authorized vehicle or pedestrian actually
engaged in work upon a highway within any
highway construction or maintenance area indicated
by official traffic-control devices, or
(2) authonzed vehicle obviously and actually
engaged in work upon a highway when the vehicle
displays lights meeting the requirements of Section
41-6-140 20
urr
Article 10. Pedestrians* Rights and Duties
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control devices
- Other controls.
41-6-78. Pedcstriani' right of way • Duty of pedestrian.
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right of way - Limits on
pedestrians.
41-6-79.10. Emergency vehicle - Necessary signals Duties of operator - Pedestrian to yield
41-6-79.20. Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or
barrier prohibited.
41-6-80. Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid
pedestrians - Audible signals and caution.
41-6-80.1. Operators to yield right-of-way to Mind
pedestrian - Duties of blind pedestrian - Use of cane
- Failure to yield - Liability.
41-6-80.5. Vehicle crossing sidewalk • Operator to
yield.
41-641. Repealed.
41-6-82. Walking along or upon roadways when there Is
a sidewalk • Standing in roadway for prohibited
purposes - Pedestrians under the Influence - Vehicle
right-of-way.
414-82.10. Unmarked crosswalk locations •
Restrictions on pedestrian.
41-6-82.50. Pedestrian vehicles.
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control
devices • Other controls.
(1) A pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any
official traffic-control device specifically applicable
to him unless otherwise directed by a peace officer
(2) Pedestnans are subject to traffic and pedestrian-control signals under Sections 41-6-24 and
41-6-25
19$7
41-6-78. Pedestrians' right-of-way - Duty of
pedestrian.
(l)(a) When traffic-control signals are not in
place or not in operatiGn, the operator of a vehicle
shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or
stopping if necessary to yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway upon which
the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is
approaching so closely from the opposite half of the
roadway as to be in danger This subsection does
not apply under conditions o f Subsection 41-679(2).
(b) A pedestrian may not suddenly leave a curb
or other place o f safety and walk or run into the
path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute
an immediate hazard
(2) When a vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the
operator of any other vehicle approaching from the
rear may not overtake and pass the stopped vehicle
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right-of-way limits on pedestrians.
(I) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point
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41-6-87.7.
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stop, as far out of the way of traffic as practical.
After stopping he shall yield to any traffic proceeding in either direction along the roadway he had
been using. After yielding and complying with any
official traffic-control device or peace officer regulating traffic, he may proceed in the new direction.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) and (2), the
Department of Transportation and local authorities
in their respective jurisdictions may cause official
traffic-control devices to be placed and require and
direct that a specific course be traveled by turning
bicycles and mopeds. When the devices are placed, a
person may not turn a bicycle other than as directed
by the devices.
\m
41-6-87.7. Bicycles and mopeds - T u r n signals.
(1) Except as provided in this section, a person
riding a bicycle or moped shall comply with Section
41-6-69.
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left when
required shall be given continuously during not less
than the last 100 feet traveled by the bicycle or
moped before turning, and shall be given while the
bicycle or moped is stopped waiting to turn. A
signal by hand and arm need not be given continuously if the hand is needed in the control or operation of the bicycle or moped.
im
41-6-S7.8. Bicycle and moped inspections - At
request of officer.
A peace officer may at any time upon reasonable
cause to believe that a bicycle or moped is unsafe or
not equipped as required by law, or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair, require
the person riding the bicycle or moped to stop and
submit the bicycle or moped to an inspection and a
test as appropriate.
i9t7
41-6-87.9. Bicycle racing - When approved Prohibitions • Exceptions - Authorized
exemptions from traffic laws.
(1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited under
Section 41-6-51, except as authorized in this
section.
(2) Bicycle racing on a highway is permitted when
a racing event is approved by state or local authorities on any highway under their respective jurisdictions. Approval of bicycle highway racing events
may be granted only under conditions which assure
reasonable safety for all race participants, spectators, and other highway users, and which prevent
unreasonable interference with traffic flow which
would seriously inconvenience other highway users.
(3) By agreement witlAhe approving authority,
participants in an approved bicycle highway racing
event may be exempted from compliance with any
traffic laws otherwise applicable, if traffic control is
adequate to assure the safety of all highway users.
1987
41-6-88. Bicydes and mopeds - Carrying bundle
• One hand on handle bars.
A person operating a bicycle or moped may not
carry any package, bundle, or article which prevents
the use of both hands in the control and operation
of the bicycle or moped. A person operating a
bicycle or moped shall keep at least one hand on the
handlebars at all times.
\ni
41-6-89. Bicycle • Prohibited equipment Brakes required.
(1) A bicycle may not be equipped with, and a
person may not use upon a bicycle, any siren or
whistle.
(2) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake
or brakes which enable its driver to stop the bicycle
within 25 feet from a speed of 10 miles per hour on
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dry, level, clean pavement.
41-6-90. Bicydes - Lamps and reflective
material required.
,,
(1) Every bicycle in use at the times described k
Section 41-6-118 shall be equipped with a lamp
on the front emitting a white light visible from a
distance of at least 500 feet to the front and with *
red reflector of a type approved by the department
which is visible for 500 feet to the rear when directlj
in front of lawful lower beams of head lamps on a
!
motor vehicle.
(2) Every bicycle when in use at the times descr
ibed in Section 41-6-118 shall be equipped with
reflective material of sufficient size and reflectivity
to be visible from both sides for 500 feet when directly in front of lawful lower beams of head lamp*
on a motor vehicle, or in lieu of reflective material,
with a lighted lamp visible from both sides from a
distance of at least 500 feet.
(3) A bicycle or its rider may be equipped with
lights or reflectors in addition to those required by
Subsections (1) and (2).
I9ti
Article 12. Railroad Trains and Safety Zones
41-6-91 through 41-6-92. Repealed.
41-6-93. Driving on tracks.
41-6-94. Driving through safety zone.

41-6-91 through 41-6-92. Repealed.
41-6-93. Driving on tracks.
(a) It is unlawful for the driver of any vehicle
proceeding upon any track in front of a railroad
train upon a street to fail to remove such vehicle
from the track as soon as practicable after signal
from the operator of such train.
(b) When a railroad train has started to cross
an intersection no driver of a vehicle shall drive
upon or cross the tracks or in the path of such train
within the intersection in front of such train.
195J
41-6-94. Driving through safety zone.
No vehicle shall at any time be driven through oi
within a safety zone.
1*53
Article 13. Special Stops Required
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop Driving through, around or under gate or barrier
prohibited.
41-6-95.5. Trains - Interference with vehicles limited.
41-6-96. Repealed.
41-6-97. Railroad grade crossings • Certain vehicles
must stop - Exceptions - Regulations.
41-6-98. Dunes respecting crawler type tractor, power
shovel, derrick or other equipment or structure.
41-6-99. Designation of through highways - Stop signs,
yield signs and traffic-control devices • Designation of
intersections as locations for preferential right-of-way
treatment.
41-6-100. Vehicles emerging from alleys, buildings,
private roads or driveways must stop prior to sidewalk
area or street.
41-6-100.10. School bus • Signs and light signals Flashing amber lights • Flashing red lights - Passing
school bus - Duty to stop - Travel in opposite
direction.

41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop
• Driving through, around or under gate or
barrier prohibited.
(a) Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing, the driver of such
vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than
ten feet from the nearest track of such railroad and
shall not proceed until he can do so safely when:
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(1) A clearly visible electric o r mechanical signal
device gives warning of the immediate approach of a
train.
(2) A crossing gate is lowered, o r when a
human flagman gives o r continues t o give a signal
of the approach or passage of a train.
(3) A railroad train approaching within approximately 1,500 feet o f the highway crossing emits a
signal audible from such distance and such train by
reason of its speed or nearness t o such crossing is an
immediate hazard.
(4) An approaching train is plainly visible and is
in hazardous proximity to such crossing.
(b) No person shall drive any vehicle through,
around or under any crossing gate or barrier at a
railroad crossing while such gates or barrier is closed
or is being opened or closed.
i*S3
41-6-95.5. Trains - Interference with vehicles
limited.
N o person o r government agency shall operate
any train in a manner t o prevent vehicular use of
any roadway for a period of time in excess of five
consecutive minutes except:
(1) When necessary t o comply with signals affecting the safety of the movement of trains;
(2) When necessary t o avoid striking any object o r
person on the track;
(3) When the train is disabled;
(4) When the train is in motion or while engaged
in switching operations or as determined by local
authority;
(5) When there is n o vehicular traffic waiting t o
use the crossing; or
(6) When necessary to comply with a governmental safety regulation.
im
41-6-96. Repealed.
irn
41-6-97. Railroad grade crossings - Certain
vehicles must stop - Exceptions - Regulations.
[(1)J Except as provided in subsection (2), the
driver of any vehicle described in regulations issued
pursuant t o subsection (3), before crossing at grade
any track o r tracks of a railroad, shall stop within
50 feet but not less than 10 feet from the nearest rail
of such railroad a n d while so stopped shall listen
and look in both directions along such track for any
approaching train, a n d for signals indicating the
approach of a train a n d shall n o t proceed until it
can be done safely. After stopping as required and
upon proceeding when it is safe t h e driver shall
cross only in a gear which will ensure n o necessity
for manually changing gears while traversing t h e
crossing a n d t h e driver shall n o t manually shift
gears while so crossing.
(2) This section shall not apply at:
(a) Any railroad grade crossing where traffic is
controlled by a police officer or human flagman;
(b) Any railroad grade crossing where traffic is
regulated by a traffic control signal;
(c) A n y railroad grade crossing where a n official traffic-control device gives notice that the
stopping requirement imposed by this section does
not apply.
(3) The department of transportation shall adopt
necessary regulations describing the vehicles which
must comply with the stopping requirements of this
section. In formulating the regulations the department of transportation shall give consideration to
the number of passengers carried by the vehicle and
the hazardous nature of any substance carried by
the vehicle. Such regulations shall correlate with and
so far as possible conform to the most recent regu-

41-6-100.10.

lation of the United States Department of Transportation.
1978
41-6-98. Duties respecting crawler type tractor,
power shovel, derrick or other equipment or
structure.

(1) N o person shall operate or move any crawler
type tractor, power shovel, derrick, roller o r any
equipment o r structure having normal operating
speed of ten or less miles per hour or a vertical body
or load clearance of less than 1/2 inch per foot of
the distance between a n y two adjacent axles or in
any event of less than nine inches measured above
the level surface of a roadway upon or across any
tracks at a railroad grade crossing without first
complying with this section.
(2) Notice of any such intended crossing shall be
given t o a station agent of such railroad and a reasonable time shall be given t o such railroad t o
provide proper protection at such crossing.
(3) Before making any such crossing t h e person
operating o r moving any such vehicle o r equipment
shall first stop the same not less than ten feet n o r
more than fifty feet from t h e nearest rail of such
railway and while so stopped shall listen and look in
both directions along such track for any approaching train and for signals indicating the approach of
a railroad train, a n d shall n o t proceed until the
crossing can be made safely.
(4) N o such crossing shall be made when warning
is given by automatic signal o r crossing gates o r a
flagman o r otherwise of the immediate approach of
a railroad train o r car. If a flagman is provided by
the railroad, movement over t h e crossing shall be
made under his direction.
\rt%
41-6-99. Designation of through highways Stop signs? yield signs and traffic-control devices
- Designation of intersections as locations for
preferential right-of-way treatment.
The department of transportation with reference
to state highways and local authorities with reference to highways under their jurisdiction may erect
and maintain stop signs, yield signs, or other official
traffic-control devices to designate through highways, or to designate intersections or other roadway
junctions at which vehicular traffic on one or more
of the roadways should yield or stop and yield
before entering the intersection or junction.
\m
41-6-100. Vehicles emerging from alleys,
buildings, private roads or driveways must stop
prior to sidewalk area or street.
The driver of a vehicle emerging from a n alley,
building, private r o a d o r driveway within a business
or residence district shall stop such vehicle immediately prior t o driving onto a sidewalk or onto t h e
sidewalk area extending across such alley, building
entrance, road o r driveway, or in the event there is
no sidewalk area, shall stop a t the point nearest the
street t o be entered where the driver has a view of
approaching traffic thereon.
197s
41-6-100.10. School bus - Signs and light signals
• Flashing amber lights • Flashing red lights Passing school bus - Duty to stop - Travel in
opposite direction.
(l)(a) Every school bus, when operated for the
transportation of school children, shall bear upon
the front a n d rear of the bus a plainly visible sign
containing the words "school bus" in letters not less
than eight inches in height, which shall be removed
or covered when t h e vehicle is n o t in use for the
transportation of school children.
(b) Every school bus, when operated for the
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Advisory Committee Note. — There is no
prior rule of appellate practice governing interest on money judgments This rule clarifies the
date interest is calculated on money judgments

Rule

33

that are affirmed by the court, viz , the date
the judgment was entered in the district court
The rule is, in part, similar to Rule 37, FRAP

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am J u r 2d Appeal and
Error <* 941
C.J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error * 1979
A.L.R. — Date from which interest on judgment starts running, as affected by modification of amount of judgment on appeal, 4
A L R 3 d 1221
Right to interest pending appeal, 15
A L R 3 d 411

Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A L R 4th 1099
Retrospective application and effect of state
statute or rule allowing interest or changing
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41
A L R 4th 694
Key Numbers. — Interest ®^ 39(2)

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court shall determine
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party.
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate representation. The court may
take appropriate disciplinary action against counsel who inadequately represents his client on appeal.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
designed to ensure that parties and their counsel understand that frivolous or clearly
unmentonous appeals may result in the imposition of single or double costs, including attorney's fees, and damages, as well as disciplinary
action against counsel
Paragraph (a) In the event that a motion
made during an appeal or the appeal, itself, is
determined to be frivolous or undertaken for
delay, this paragraph makes mandatory the
imposition of just damages and single or double
costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee

The paragraph adopts Rule 38, FRAP, regarding frivolous appeals, but enlarges the federal
rule to include the mandatory imposition of
costs for delay
Paragraph (b) This paragraph acknowledges
the inherent power of the supreme court to discipline counsel in appellate proceedings who
the court determines has inadequately represented his or her client The paragraph is
drawn, in part, from Rule 15(c), U S Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals See also Rule 40 involving discipline of counsel and of a party who
appears pro se

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Calfo v D C Stewart Co , 717 P 2d
697 (Utah 1986)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am J u r 2d Appeal and
Error ^ 9 1 2
C.J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error * 1358
A.L.R. — Inherent power of federal district

court to impose monetary sanctions on counsel
in absence of contempt of court, 77 A L R Fed
789
Key Numbers. - Costs o=> 259 to 263
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RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Rule

TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.
(Enacted effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons t h a t will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way t h a t is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision t h a t
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court.
(Enacted effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case.
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21
(b) Joint and s e p a r a t e petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
23
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Robert J. Debry, Esq.
4001 South 700 East
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Re:

Robert L. Gleave vs. The Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad Company, et al.

Dear Bob:
For the record, this letter is to confirm that on
February 23, 1988 The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Company and the Utah Railway Company (herein collectively
"DRGW"; made an unconditional offer to settle the
above-referenced litigation by paying your client, Robert L.
Gleave, the ful4l amount of his judgment against DRGW, plus all
accumulated post-judgment interest as of that date. DRGW
offered to settle for the stated sum in consideration for a
complete release of all claims and a stipulation of dismissal
of the lawsuit with prejudice. As of February 23, 1988, DRGWfs
offer of settlement was worth $625,868.81. Thereafter, by your
letter of March 2, 1988, Mr. Gleave rejected DRGW's offer and
instead made a $750,000 counter-offer. Mr. Gleave demanded
that he be paid over $124,000 more than the total of the
judgment amount plus all accumulated post-judgment interest.
Mr. Gleave said he wanted the extra settlement money to
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compensate him for his otherwise unsuccessful punitive damage
claim.
DRGW believes that Mr. Gleavefs rejection of DRGW's
generous unconditional offer of settlement was in bad faith.
DRGW further believes that Mr. Gleave wrongfully is prolonging
this litigation in bad faith in the hopes of reaping an
improper economic gain at the expense of both DRGW and the
court system. Evidence of Mr. Gleavefs bad faith is found in
his frivolous motion to the Court of Appeals that he be allowed
to file two petitions for reconsideration. Mr. Gleave's motion
to suspend the rules was patently frivolous because the rules
expressly forbid consecutive petitions for reconsideration.
The lower court granted a directed verdict in favor of DRGW on
Mr. Gleave1s punitive damage claim, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed that ruling in every respect. Both courts have held
that even when all the evidence is viewed in a light most
favorable to Mr. Gleave, he has not proved a valid claim under
Utah law for punitive damages. Both courts have held squarely
that punitive damages have no place in this case. Mr. Gleavefs
extreme demand for an extra $124,000 to cover his meritless
punitive damage claim thus reflects bad faith under all the
circumstances of this case.
A certiorari petition filed with the Supreme Court by
Mr. Gleave will be further evidence of Mr. Gleavefs improper
tactics and motives. Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court provides for "just damages and single or double costs,
including reasonable attorney s fees11 in cases where a litigant
files a frivolous appeal or an appeal just to delay disposition
of the case. DRGW's damages in this case could include but not
be limited to all attorneys fees and post-judgment interest
from and after February 23, 1988.
For the foregoing reasons, DRGW hereby puts you and
Mr. Gleave on notice that DRGW will resist any efforts by Mr.
Gleave to recover any post-judgment interest, costs, or other
expenses incurred after DRGW's unconditional offer of
settlement. That is, as a matter of law and equity, DRGW will
resist any effort by Mr. Gleave to profit by prolonging this
litigation beyond February 23, 1988.
In spite of DRGW's
frustration over Mr. Gleave's recent delays, DRGW remains
willing to settle the case for $625,868.81, provided that the
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release and settlement agreement would have to be in a form
acceptable to and signed by DRGW and Mr. Gleave. Just so there
is no misunderstanding, please share this letter with your
client.
Very truly yours,

Patrick J. O'Hara
PJO/ce

